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Firm Size, Technical Efficiency and Productivity 
Growth in Chinese Industry 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Since the mid-1990s, China’s state leadership has adopted a policy of nurturing the 
competitiveness of large state-owned industrial enterprises. The implications of this 
policy have been a matter of debate in the literature.  This paper seeks to provide 
some useful input into the debate.  With a view of investigating into the potential of 
long-term development of large enterprises, we estimate the “sequential production 
technology” in computing the Malmquist productivity index for various size-groups 
of enterprises in Chinese industry.  Our findings indicate that large enterprises did 
register the fastest productivity growth and improvement in technical efficiency in the 
1994-97 period.  It thus appears that large-scale, mainly state-owned Chinese 
enterprises have exhibited the potential of making noticeable improvements and the 
relevant state policy does have its justification.  
 
Keywords:  firm size, technical efficiency, productivity, China, industry 
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1. Introduction 
 
A key feature of China’s economic reform is the state’s firm grip on large-scale, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  The leadership has unambiguously indicated that 
large SOEs are not to be privatized.  The direction of reform is rather to nurture their 
capability of long-term development within the framework of public ownership 
broadly defined.  This policy was first announced in November 1993, in the Third 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the Fourteenth Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).  The reform in the subsequent years was the restructuring 
and corporatization of large SOEs, in sharp contrast to the widespread privatization of 
small-scale (and, to a lesser extent, medium-scale) SOEs.  This contrast has been 
characterized as a reform strategy of “grasping the large and letting go of the small” 
(Cao et al., 1999).  The policy of “grasping the large” was re-affirmed in September 
1997, in the Fifteenth Congress of the CCP.  And its application has been accelerated 
thereafter, despite the widespread skepticism or even criticism over such a South 
Korean- or Japanese-style policy following the eruption of the East Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 (Lo and Smyth, 2005; Smyth, 2000; Sutherland, 2003, ch.2). 
 Theoretically, in the relevant literature, scholars have had different views on 
the policy pursuit of building up large business conglomerates in China.  Nolan 
(1996) and Lo (1997, ch.4), among others, propose that the existence of 
well-performing large enterprises and with it the realization of static and dynamic 
increasing returns are necessary for China to successfully accomplish the task of late 
industrialization.  Lee (1993), and more recently Zhang (2004), in contrast, submit 
that large Chinese enterprises are prone to problems of soft budget constraints, 
muddled property rights and multi-layered principal-agent relations. 
Scholarly studies of the actual performance of China’s large enterprises have also 
come out with diverse results.  Naughton (1994) is probably the first to point out that 
China’s large (and medium-scale) enterprises registered an outstanding growth 
performance in the first decade of the reform era, and that virtually all of these 
enterprises were in fact SOEs.  Lo (1999), using aggregate national data, analyzes 
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the productivity performance of large-and-medium enterprises, and finds that the total 
factor productivity (TFP) of these enterprises grew faster than that of the rest of 
Chinese industry during 1980-96.  Zheng et al. (2003), analyzing a sample of SOEs, 
find that both large and small SOEs registered positive productivity growth during 
1980-94, with the former having a much better performance.  Cheng and Lo (2002), 
meanwhile, highlight the outstanding financial performance of large enterprises by 
showing the trend of increasing concentration of market sales and thus profits from 
small to large enterprises. 
In contrast, Otsuka et al. (1998, ch.7), analyzing a sample of 48 enterprises in the 
machine tool industry in the year 1991, find that the industry was characterized by 
serious diseconomies of scale and, as a result, large SOEs had a significantly lower 
level of TFP than small SOEs and non-SOEs.  Analyzing a much bigger sample of 
300 large-and-medium SOEs and 200 collective township-and-village enterprises in 
the period 1984-88, Woo et al. (1994) find that the SOEs had a much slower growth in 
TFP.  Steinfeld (1998, ch.1), in assessing the financial performance of SOEs, claims 
that the vast majority of both large and small SOEs were “net destroyers of assets”.  
And, in a similar vein, the World Bank (1996, p.23) claims that “(China's state-owned 
industry) remains a drag on the economy during the reform era – even though their 
efficiency might be improving.” 
The empirical studies reviewed above do not directly address the issue as to 
whether the Chinese state leadership’s policy for large SOEs, i.e., of “restructuring 
without privatization”, is a reasonable pursuit.  To address the issue requires 
clarifying the enterprises’ potential of long-term development.  This, in line with the 
contrasting theoretical perspectives indicated above, amounts to investigating into the 
sources of productivity growth of the enterprises and relate these sources to their 
specific moves in ownership and organizational restructuring.  Earlier works such as 
Otsuka et al. (1998, ch.7) do attempt to analyze the importance of economies of scale 
in the TFP of large SOEs, while Lo (1999) attempts to analyze the significance of 
specialized division of labor in accounting for the TFP growth of various categories of 
enterprises including large-and-medium enterprises.  In a study that is perhaps the 
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most relevant thus far, Jefferson et al. (2003) explicitly analyze the impact on 
productivity growth of the three aspects of restructuring in large-and-medium SOEs in 
the period 1994-99: namely, ownership diversification, organizational reform, and the 
building up of research and development capability.  And the finding is that both the 
first and third aspects are of significant impact while the second aspect is not.  This 
does not fully agree with Lin and Zhu (2001) who find that organizational reform is 
also of positive impact on enterprise performance. 
This paper seeks to provide some useful input into the inquiry indicated in the 
preceding paragraph.  For the purpose of assessing the state policy of “restructuring 
without privatization”, we attempt a study of the efficiency and productivity 
performance of large industrial enterprises vis-à-vis small and medium ones in a way 
that is directly relevant to the concern over long-term development.  Specifically, we 
compute the Malmquist productivity index by which the TFP can be decomposed into 
technical progress and change in technical efficiency.  While most nonparametric 
studies of production frontiers follow the method proposed by Färe et al. (1994) in 
computing the Malmquist productivity index, we adopt a new procedure for Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) proposed by Nin, Arndt and Preckel (2003).  The 
latter approach avoids the possibility of having a negative technical progress, i.e., 
technical regress.  By helping to separate out long-term development from 
short-term fluctuations, this approach thus fits well into our concern over the potential 
of long-term development of China’s large enterprises.  And it is particularly 
appropriate for analyzing enterprise performance during the period of 1994-97, which 
is a period of macroeconomic tightening and slowing down in the growth of aggregate 
demand.1
There are two main reasons for focusing our study on the 1994-97 period.  First, 
as indicated in the beginning paragraph of this section, this period is the first, 
experimenting phase of the policy of “restructuring without privatization”.  It was 
towards the end of the period, from late 1997 and early 1998, that the state leadership 
decided to accelerate the application of the policy and to continue with it over the long 
term.2  This decision was, at least in part, based on a particular assessment of the 
actual performance of large SOEs during the 1994-97 period.  And there are in fact 
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no shortage of alternative assessments that are rather dismissive of the preceding 
experiments (see, e.g., Wu, 2004, ch.4).  Our analysis is thus of value for addressing 
whether the state decision is justifiable.  Meanwhile, the second reason for focusing 
on the 1994-97 period is technical in nature.  This concerns the non-availability of 
consistent data after the period.  Relevant industrial statistical data after 1998, 
published by the Chinese government, are of different definitions and coverage from 
those of previous years.  Data of 1997 and before cover all the industrial enterprises 
with independent accounting status, while those of 1998 and after cover all 
state-owned and “above-scale (of five million yuan in sales revenue)” 
non-state-owned industrial enterprises.  The comparability problem for the category 
of small enterprises is particularly serious – the number of small enterprises in 1997 
was 444,568, while there were only 141,672 in 1998 under the new definition. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we discuss the 
importance of large enterprises in Chinese industry and relevant policy issues.  
Section 3 introduces the quantitative methods that we use for investigation.  Section 
4 describes our data set.  We report and discuss the empirical results in Section 5. 
Apart from computing the technical efficiency scores and the components of the 
Malmquist index, we also attempt to identify the major determinants of the efficiency 
and productivity of Chinese industry by regression analyses.  In particular, apart 
from the size of the enterprises, we investigate whether the location and the industrial 
size of a province affect the performance.  Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The role of large industrial enterprises in China 
 
Discernibly, the Chinese state leadership’s policy of “grasping the large (state-owned 
enterprises)” appears to be designated to serve three purposes: namely, to retain a 
significant degree of socialist character in the society, to maintain state control over 
the “commanding heights” of the economy, and to enable Chinese industry to 
withstand globalized market competition.  A quick review on the evolution of 
reforms and actual development of large enterprises clearly shows this point. 
 To begin with, it should be noted that large enterprises have persistently formed 
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the core of China’s state industry and the industrial sector as whole.3  Figure 1 
presents the trends of evolution of the percentage shares of large enterprises in the 
value-added, labor employment and capital of Chinese industry as a whole.  It can be 
seen that, between 1978 and 2002, the value-added share increased from 31% to 36%, 
the employment share increased from 17% to 21%, and the capital share remained 
unchanged at 44%.  And notice that these occurred against the background of 
tremendous expansions in output and capital for Chinese industry as a whole during 
this period.  It is also of note from Figure 1 that the capital share of large enterprises 
has persistently exceeded the employment share, by a wide margin throughout the 
reform era.  This indicates that large enterprises are mostly in capital-intensive 
industries – these have often been considered as the “commanding heights” of the 
economy by the Chinese government. 
[Figure 1] 
 
 A further important aspect of the nature of large enterprises is that they have 
remained mostly state-owned or state-controlled, even after a quarter-century of 
market reform.  Formally, according to official statistics, strictly-defined SOEs 
accounted for the lion’s share of 87% of the value-added of large industrial enterprises 
in 1993.  The share subsequently decreased to 74% by 1997, amid the state-enforced 
drive of transforming large SOEs into shareholding firms (see below).  In view of the 
fact that shareholding firms of which state agents formally have a controlling stake 
typically account for around 6% of total industrial value-added and that most of these 
firms are large enterprises, the value-added share in large enterprises of SOEs and 
state-controlled shareholding firms combined is likely to have remained at around 
80% in 1997.  The Chinese government has ceased to publish data of SOEs by firm 
sizes after 1997, but it could be reasonably estimated that the value-added share in 
large enterprises of SOEs would remain at 67%, and of SOEs plus state-controlled 
shareholding firms would remain at around 75%, in 2002.4  Yet, it should be further 
noted that, for the vast majority of the shareholding firms of which state agents do not 
formally have a controlling stake, it is found that state agents have in fact remained as 
the ultimate controllers through a pyramid of shareholding relationships (Lin and Zhu, 
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2001; Liu, Sun and Liu, 2003). 
 The policy of “grasping the large” also reflects the state leadership’s intention to 
promote the international competitiveness of China’s large industrial enterprises.  It 
is interesting to note that China’s attempt to build up large business conglomerates in 
the spirit of the South Korean and Japanese “model” did not slow down in the wake of 
the East Asian financial crisis.  On the contrary, it was precisely during the period of 
1998-2002 that this attempt made considerable headway: the average scale of large 
enterprises (i.e., value-added per firm) relative to the industrial total increased from 
290 times in 1998 to 369 times in 2002 (Lo and Smyth, 2005)5.  Perhaps more 
importantly, a large proportion of China’s research and development activities are 
conducted in large industrial enterprises.  Official statistics show that, as of 2002, 
R&D expenditure in large and medium enterprises amounted to Rmb 56 billion yuan, 
which was equivalent to 43.5% of the national total.  In terms of manpower in R&D 
activities, in the same year, there were a total of 813,000 scientists and engineers in 
large and medium industrial enterprises, or 37.4% of the national total (figures from 
Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook], 2003, p.749 and p.751).  
It is because of the three objectives indicated above that the state policy of 
“grasping the large” has encompassed a range of measures that have been subject to 
considerable controversies.  At the heart of the policy is the decision that the target 
of reforming large SOEs is to establish the “modern enterprise system”.  And the 
main measures pertaining to this target concern both ownership and organizational 
restructuring.  By ownership restructuring the Chinese leadership has referred to the 
transformation of SOEs into shareholding firms, with the (formal or informal) 
controlling shareholders being mainly state agents.  Specifically for large SOEs, the 
reform has been to turn them into either limited liability companies or limited liability 
stock companies.  With this reform, the state-owner has thus imposed a limit on its 
entitlement as well as its obligation vis-à-vis the reformed enterprises.  This has 
formed the underpinning of a wide range of organizational restructuring measures 
particularly the setting up of a structure of corporate governance that is characterized 
by relationships of check and balance between the shareholders’ congress (gudong 
dahui), the board of directors (dongshihui), the supervisory board (jianshihui), and the 
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management.  Other crucial measures have included shedding surplus labor, hiving 
off “non-productive” affiliates or operations, and liquidating idle properties and 
assets. 
Significantly, the ownership and organizational restructuring measures described 
above have been implemented with clearly-defined and clearly-limited helps from the 
government.  In particular, the re-capitalization of reforming large SOEs, through 
measures such as the state-owner’s injection of new capital and the state-initiated 
program of debt-equity swaps, has been implemented in the context of a reciprocity 
relationship with the enterprises – that is, the SOEs have had to make themselves 
converging to the “modern enterprise system” in exchange for the re-capitalization 
measures.  It is precisely such a character of “restructuring without privatization” 
that the state policy towards large SOEs has turned out to be controversial.  Yet, it 
has also turned out that the state has actually accelerated the application of the policy 
after 1997, both in terms of promoting the establishment of the “modern enterprise 
system” and of helping the enterprises to strengthen their technological and financial 
capability.  This reflects its belief that large SOEs by establishing the “modern 
enterprise system” would become sufficiently efficient and hence – in conjunction 
with the strengthening of their capability – internationally competitive.  
 How should the state leadership’s policy towards large SOEs be assessed? In 
particular, does the actual performance of large SOEs in the period of 1994-97, that is, 
the experimental phase of the policy of “grasping the large”, give confidence for the 
long-term prospects of the policy?  For, it was at least in part based on its positive 
assessment of the performance that, by late 1997, the state leadership decided to 
accelerate the application of the policy and to make it a long-term one.  Yet, as can 
be seen from Figure 1, 1994-97 was the period where large industrial enterprise have 
had the worst ever performance, with its output and capital share of the national total 
both falling very abruptly.  It is conceivably that the fall in capital share reflects the 
on-going ownership and organizational restructuring of the enterprises.  It is also 
conceivable that the fall in output share reflects, in addition to the restructuring, the 
unfavorable macroeconomic conditions during this period.  But, is the performance a 
transitional phenomenon, or is it a reflection of long-term development?  For, what is 
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relevant to the justification of the state policy is, ultimately, the long-term 
developmental potential of the enterprises.  This is the central issue which we 
attempt to address in the paper. 
 
3. Measuring technical efficiency and productivity growth – a nonparametric 
approach 
 
To evaluate the performance of China’s large industrial enterprises relative to other 
enterprises, we estimate the technical efficiency and the productivity growth of each 
group of enterprises.  Technical efficiency measures the output of a production as 
compared with the maximum possible output, that is, the output level on the 
production frontier.  The level of technical efficiency thus indicates how efficient a 
production unit utilizes its inputs.  Another important dimension of evaluating the 
performance of a production unit is the total factor productivity (TFP) growth, that is, 
the growth of output that is not attributable to the increase in inputs.  Färe et al. 
(1994) suggest that TFP growth can be measured by the Malmquist productivity index, 
which can be decomposed into two factors, technical progress (which indicates the 
shift of production frontier) and the change in technical efficiency.  Although this 
method has been widely used in empirical studies, it sometimes gives rise to the 
problematic result of having a negative technical progress (that is, technical regress).  
We will follow the procedure recently proposed by Nin, Arndt and Preckel (2003) to 
compute the efficiency and productivity scores that can avoid this problem.  To 
explain the method, it is convenient to first introduce the approach of Färe et al. 
(1994).  To start with, suppose that we have an output possibility set at time t: 
 
(1) Pt(x) = {yt: xt can produce yt}, 
 
where xt and yt are the input and output vectors respectively and t =1,…,T. To measure 
the technical efficiency of a production unit at time t, we can make use of output 
distance function, which can be defined as:  
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(2) 
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The distance function measures the maximum possible output that can be 
produced by a given amount of inputs xt. Note that when θ is minimized, yt/θ is 
maximized.  
 The idea can be shown diagrammatically by a simplified case of one-input and 
one-output with constant returns to scale (CRS) technology. Points D and E in Figure 
2 represent the input-output combinations of a production unit in periods t and t+1 
respectively. In both periods, it is operating below the production possibility frontier. 
At time t, the frontier is determined by the best-performing unit which is producing at 
F.  Correspondingly, at time t+1, the best-performing unit (not necessarily the same 
at the one at F) passes through the point F’. In period t (correspondingly, period t+1), 
with input xt (xt+1), it should be able to produce ya (yc) if it has full technical efficiency. 
Thus the technical efficiency is measured by yt/ya (yt+1/yc).  
[Figure 2] 
 
Productivity growth can be measured by the part of output growth that is not 
contributed by input growth. In Figure 1, we can calculate a productivity index by 
(yt+1/yt)/(yb/ya), where (yt+1/yt) is the output growth and (yb/ya) represents a movement 
along the production frontier in period t. This can be rewritten as (yt+1/yb)/(yt/ya), 
where the numerator is a distance function for output in period t+1 with reference to 
the technology of period t and the denumerator is the distance function representing 
the technical efficiency in period t.  This is precisely the Malmquist Productivity 
Index defined by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982a, 1982b), with reference to 
the technology of the initial period: 
 
(3) 
),(
),( 11
ttt
ttt
t
CCD yxd
yxd
m
++
=  
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 However, we can also choose the technology in period t+1 as the reference in 
defining a productivity index. The Malmquist Productivity Index in relation to the 
technology of the final period can be defined as: 
 
(4) 
),(
),(
1
111
1
ttt
ttt
t
CCD yxd
yxd
m +
+++
+ = . 
 
The two indices appear to be identical in the simple case represented by Figure 
2.  However, they may be different in the cases of multiple inputs or multiple outputs.  
To avoid the arbitrariness in choosing the benchmark, Färe et al. (1994) specify the 
Malmquist Productivity Index as the geometric mean of the above two indexes: 
 
(5) 
2/1
1
11111
11
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),(
),(
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Färe et al. (1994) shows that this index is equivalent to: 
 
(6) 
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where the ratio outside the square bracket measures the change in technical efficiency 
between the years t and t+1. The geometric mean of the two ratios inside the square 
bracket captures the shift in technology between the two periods evaluated at xt and 
xt+1.  
In Figure 2, the two components of the Malmquist Index as in Equation (6) is 
represented by: 
 
(7) Efficiency change = at
ct
yy
yy
/
/1+ ; and 
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(8) Technical change = 
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For illustration of ideas, consider the situation when the new frontier at time 
t+1 happens to be F” instead of F’.  This can happen when, in the case of 
agricultural production, there is a natural disaster under which the best-performing 
unit produced less than before with the same inputs.  In the case of industrial 
production, it can be that a general deterioration in the macroeconomic environment 
leads to a decrease in productivity.  Under such situation, one can easily check that 
the production unit has a positive change in technical efficiency but a negative 
technical progress, following the decomposition method described above.6  However, 
a negative technical progress creates uneasiness in the interpretation.  A production 
technology (as represented by the production frontier) is determined by the stock of 
scientific and organizational knowledge we have in combining input factors to 
produce outputs.  Such knowledge, once acquired, cannot be destroyed under normal 
circumstances.  Thus, normally, the production frontier can either remain unchanged 
or shift upward.  However, the method suggested by Färe et al. (1994) does not take 
care of this.  The production frontier for a particular time period is constructed based 
only on the observation points in that period, representing a “contemporaneous 
production technology”.  That is why negative technical progress may appear in the 
case of having a F” in period t+1.  To avoid this shortcoming, Nin, Arndt and 
Preckel (2003) invoke the concept of “sequential production technology” in the 
computation of the Malmquist productivity index.  The underlying idea is that firms 
can do what they could do before.  To capture the cumulative nature of technology, 
the “sequential production technology” in period t measures the maximum possible 
output that can be produced in or before period t with a given amount of inputs.  Nin, 
Arndt and Preckel (2003) apply the method to analyze the agricultural productivity of 
developing countries and find very different results from those using the traditional 
method.  
Most previous empirical studies follow Färe et al. (1994) to use DEA to 
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estimate the distance functions.7 To construct the “sequential production technology”, 
we have to modify the linear programming procedures.  Suppose there are K regions 
(indexed by k) using N inputs (indexed by n) to produce M products (indexed by m). 
 and  denote the nkinx
ki
my
th input and mth output in the kth region at time period i (i=t, 
t+1). We have to solve a linear programming problem to evaluate each of the distance 
functions in equation (6). Färe et al. (1994) estimate the distance function for a 
particular region k*, assuming a constant returns-to-scale technology, by 
(9)   [ ] *
,
1'*'* max),( k
z
ikiki yxd θθ=
−
s.t.  ,  m = 1,…,M, ∑
=
≤
K
k
ki
m
kiik
m
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1
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1
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n
K
k
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n
ki xxz ≤∑
=
,  n = 1,…,N, 
0≥kiz ,   k = 1,…,K, 
 
where zki is a variable indicating the intensity at which a particular activity is 
employed in constructing the frontier of the production set. Note that when i=i’=t 
(correspondingly, i=i’=t+1), solving the above linear programming yields the 
technical efficiency in period t (t+1).  
 
In contrast, Nin, Arndt and Preckel (2003) suggest that the following linear 
programming be run: 
(10)   [ ] *
,
1'*'* max),( k
z
ikiki yxd θθ=
−
s.t.  ,  m = 1,…,M, ∑∑
= =
≤
i
s
K
k
ks
m
ksik
m
ik yzy
1 1
'*'*θ
'*
1 1
ik
n
i
s
K
k
ks
n
ks xxz ≤∑∑
= =
,  n = 1,…,N, 
0≥ksz ,   k = 1,…,K,and s=1,…, i. 
 It can be seen that the changes in the constraints ensure that the frontier so 
constructed for a time period will never fall below the best technology in the past.  
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 Up to this point, we have concentrated our discussion on constant returns to scale 
(CRS) technology.  It is certainly possible to construct a production frontier based on 
variable returns to scale (VRS) technology by DEA.  This can be done by adding the 
constraint  to the linear programming. In our analysis, we do not have any 
a priori reason to assume a particular technology, so we do both for the analysis of 
technical efficiency.  As will be seen below, the results do not differ much in the two 
cases.  Färe et al. (1994) suggest that in the decomposition of the Malmquist index, 
the component “efficiency change” can further be decomposed into “scale efficiency 
change” and “pure technical efficiency change”.  However, as pointed out by 
Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1995), a Malmquist index may not correctly measure total 
factor productivity (TFP) changes when VRS is assumed for the technology.  Ray 
and Desli (1997) also contend that there may be confusion in the simultaneous use of 
CRS and VRS technologies within the same decomposition of the Malmquist index. 
We do not perform this decomposition to avoid confusions. 
1=∑ ksz
 
4. Data description 
 
We have collected the province-level data of the inputs and outputs of large-, medium- 
and small-scale enterprises for the years 1994 and 1997 (data for 1995 and 1996 are 
not available).  We treat each province of Mainland China as having three production 
units, each for one size-group of enterprises.  Since the data of Xizang is not 
available, we have data for 29 province-level administrative units, that is, provinces 
plus centrally-administered municipalities and autonomous regions.  Thus, we have 
87 production units for each year.  The output is the industrial value-added registered 
in 1990 constant prices.  As usual, we have labor and capital inputs. The former is 
represented by the average number of employees during the year.  As for capital, we 
use the data of the average net value of fixed assets during the year, deflated to 1990 
prices by the provincial deflator for investment in fixed assets.  The deflator is 
obtained from the Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues.  For all other 
variables, the data are obtained from Industrial Statistical Yearbook of China, 1995 
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and 1998.  Descriptive statistics of the variables are listed in Table 1.  
[Table 1] 
 
5. Results and discussions 
 
5.1  The Malmquist index and decomposition 
 
Our quantitative analysis starts by applying the method of Färe et al. (1994). As the 
Malmquist index contains multiplicative elements, it is convenient to summarize the 
results by the geometric means (instead of the average) of the indexes of the provinces.  
In Table 2, the row for “whole industrial sector” reports the geometric means for the 
87 observations, while the other three rows report the geometric means of the 29 
observations (provinces) for the particular sector.  All the three indexes for the 
“whole industrial sector” are smaller than one, indicating that there was negative 
growth in technical efficiency, technical progress and TFP during 1994-97.  Note that 
the technical efficiency declined only slightly.  The major problem lied in the 
technical regress.  A breakdown of the enterprises of different sizes indicates that the 
problem mainly came from small- and medium-scale enterprises.  In any case, as 
explained above, the result is at odds with common conception of technical progress, 
and, more specifically, does not fit into our concern over the potential of long-term 
development (separated out from short-term fluctuations) of China’s large industrial 
enterprises.  Thus, it is desirable that we take a further step to apply the procedures 
proposed by Nin, Arndt and Preckel (2003).   
[Table 2] 
 
Table 3 reports the results that are based on the analytics of the “sequential 
production technology”.  China’s industrial sector as a whole registered a negative 
growth of 6.5% [i.e., (0.935 - 1) x 100%] in TFP.  This is not surprising, as China 
was under a tight macroeconomic policy during 1994-97.  However, during this 
same period, the industrial sector still managed to have a technical progress of 4.5%. 
In contrast, there was a deterioration of technical efficiency by 10.5% [i.e., (0.895 - 1) 
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x 100%].  This pattern is different from the results that are based on the 
“contemporaneous production technology”, in which case the frontier output in 1997 
was under-estimated – thus resulting in the finding of a negative technical progress 
and smaller change in technical efficiency.   
In the case of “sequential production technology”, the performance of large 
enterprises registered the best performance in all the three indicators.  It was the only 
group of enterprises that had an improvement in technical efficiency.  Its technical 
progress of 11.9% was much faster than the 1.4% and 0.4% of the medium- and 
small-scale enterprises respectively. As a result, large enterprises registered a 
remarkable TFP growth of 18.7% during this period. Without the good performance of 
this sector, the overall performance of China’s industrial sector could be worse in this 
period.   
[Table 3] 
 
5.2 Technical efficiency 
 
Table 4 provides information about the levels of technical efficiency of each group of 
enterprises when the frontiers are constructed by CRS and VRS technologies, 
respectively.  Consider the case of CRS.  The first thing to note is that the technical 
efficiency of large enterprises on average was lower than the whole industrial sector 
in 1994.  The geometric mean of provincial technical efficiency indices for large 
enterprises was 0.392, which was significantly below the geometric mean of 0.446 of 
the technical efficiency indices for the whole industrial sector.  However, due to the 
substantial improvement of large enterprises, their technical efficiency (0.416) 
became higher than the whole industrial sector average (0.399) in 1997.  This means 
that large enterprises were making significant improvements during this period.  In 
contrast, medium- and small-scale enterprises suffered from big declines.  The 
technical efficiency score of medium-scale enterprises in 1997 was only 0.323, the 
lowest among the three groups of enterprises.  In both years, small enterprises 
registered the highest technical efficiency scores.  This was probably because they 
were subject to less policy restrictions and burdens. In particular, under the state 
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policy of “letting go the small”, small enterprises started much earlier than large and 
medium ones in shedding surplus labor. 
[Table 4] 
 
Meanwhile, as shown in the lower part of Table 4, there were only three 
production units on the frontier in 1994, namely, Yunnan-L, Beijing-S and Liaoning-S.  
By 1997, there were two more units that lied on the sequential production frontier.  
Both of them, Guangdong-L and Yunnan-L, were of the sector of large enterprises. 
Following Kumar and Russell (2002), we can exploit the nature of constant returns to 
scale and depict the production frontiers by plotting output per worker against capital 
per worker in a two dimensional diagram.  As shown in Figure 3, the units that 
pushed the production frontier upward in 1997 were Guangdong-L and Yunnan-L.  
That means the large enterprises played an important role in improving the technical 
progress during this period. 
[Figure 3] 
 
When we assume a VRS technology, as expected, the geometric means for all the 
sectors are higher than in the case of CRS.  With the more flexible technology of 
VRS, more observation points are found to be on the frontier and the frontier is closer 
to the production units inside.  The numbers of production units on the frontier were 
eight and seven in 1994 and 1997, respectively.  In both years, the large enterprise 
sectors of four provinces (Guangdong–L, Shanghai-L, Hainan-L and Yunnan-L) were 
on the frontier.  The first three are located in the coastal region whereas the last one 
is located in the western region.  The small enterprise sectors of three provinces also 
lied on the frontier in 1994 (Beijing–S, Liaoning–S and Jiangsu–S).  All these are 
located in the coastal region.  The performance of medium-scale enterprises seemed 
to be less impressive.  Only one province of this sector was on the frontier in 1994 
(Qinghai-M), and none in 1997.  Similar to the case of CRS, the geometric mean of 
large enterprises (0.488) was lower than that of the whole industrial sector (0.511) in 
1994.  However, in 1997 the former increased to 0.520, while the latter dropped to 
0.463.  Thus, large enterprises made the greatest improvements in both cases of CRS 
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and VRS. 
Given these observation points on the production frontier, one would like to 
check whether the efficiency performance of the industrial enterprises has a clear 
location pattern.  We break down each size-group of enterprises into coastal, central 
and western regions and report the geometric means in Table 5.  It is obvious that in 
all the three size-groups of enterprises, the coastal region registered a higher level of 
technical efficiency in both years, regardless of what technology we assume.  The 
relative performance of the central and the western regions is less clear.  For small 
enterprises, the central region performed better in all the four cases.  For large 
enterprises, the central region performed worse than the western region under CRS, 
but the reverse is true under VRS.  As for medium enterprises, western provinces 
performed better than central provinces in 1994 under CRS and VRS, but the reverse 
is true in 1997 under CRS. However, the performances of the two regions were 
equally bad under VRS in 1997. 
[Table 5] 
 
5.3 Regression analysis 
 
 While the geometric means provide an overall yet rough picture of the 
performance of different size-groups of enterprises, a more rigorous test of the 
determinants of the indices can be conducted by regression analysis.  Two sets of 
regressions are run.  The first set uses ordinary least squares (OLS) to find out the 
determinants of the efficiency change, technical change and TFP growth.  The 
second set of regressions employ Tobit models to find out the determinants of 
technical efficiency.  Tobit models are used here because the value of technical 
efficiency ranges from 0 to 1.   
 We test the same exogenous variables in both sets of regressions.  Firstly, we 
include two size dummies, one for large and one for medium enterprises, to examine 
whether different size-groups of enterprises have significant differences in the 
performance.  Secondly, we include a dummy for coastal provinces and another one 
for central provinces.  Coastal provinces have registered higher economic growth 
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than inland areas, but their performance in terms of efficiency and productivity is less 
clear.  Lastly, we include the industrial value of the province (Psize) to see if the total 
size of the industry sector of a province will affect the performance of its respective 
sectors (i.e., large, medium and small enterprises).  It is well-known that the new 
economic geography suggests that firms will benefit if they can produce in nearby 
locations.  This may generate some agglomeration effect that enhances the 
performance of the enterprises (Fujiti and Thisse, 2002).  
Table 6 reports the results for the first set of regressions.  In all the three 
regressions, the coefficients for large enterprises are all positive and significant, 
confirming that large enterprises indeed had better performance than smaller ones.  
In contrast, the dummy for medium enterprises were all insignificant, indicating that 
their performance was not much below that of small enterprises.  The location 
dummies were also insignificant in most cases, except that the coastal dummy is 
positive and significant in the technical progress regression.  Interestingly, the 
industrial size of the provinces (Psize) does not have any significant impact on any of 
the three indicators (see discussion below).  
[Table 6] 
 
The results for the second set of regressions are reported in Table 7.  Under 
CRS technology, the technical efficiency of both large and medium enterprises was 
significantly worse than small enterprises in 1994.  Although the dummy for large 
enterprises was still negative in 1997, it was no longer statistically significant.  These 
findings suggest that large enterprises had an unambiguously lower level of technical 
efficiency than small enterprises in 1994, but they made so much improvement in the 
subsequent years so that the level became indistinguishable from that of small 
enterprises in 1997.  In both years, the coastal dummy was positive and significant, 
implying that coastal provinces had higher technical scores than western provinces. 
However, the performance of central provinces was not significantly different from 
western provinces.  Meanwhile, the size of the industrial sector of province did have 
very significant impact on the efficiency performance of the industrial enterprises.  
The larger the size of industrial sector, the higher the technical efficiency.  This is 
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quite different from the first set of regressions, in which Psize is insignificant in all 
the regressions. A possible explanation is that as the relative industrial sizes of the 
provinces did not change much during this period, this factor did not generate much 
change in technical efficiency and technical progress during this period. 
[Table 7] 
 
Under the assumption of VRS technology, the two size dummies are significant 
in 1994.  However, similar to the case of CRS, the dummy for large enterprises 
became insignificant in 1997.  Thus our result is not sensitive to the choice of 
technology in the DEA. The dummy for medium enterprises were negative and highly 
significant.  Its coefficient decreased from -0.1248 to -0.2165 during 1994-97, 
reflecting the fact that medium enterprises were falling further behind small 
enterprises.  An interesting phenomenon was that the coastal dummy was not 
statistical significant in 1994, but it became significant in 1997.  In other words, the 
coastal provinces did not have much advantage in 1994, but they were able to take the 
opportunity of reforms during this period to improve their performance.  Finally, 
similar to the case of CRS, the size of the industrial sector of a province also had 
positive and significant impact on the technical efficiency of enterprises. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Since the mid-1990s, whilst permitting the privatization of small enterprises, China’s 
state leadership has persistently adopted a policy of nurturing the competitiveness of 
large state-owned industrial enterprises. The developmental implications of this policy, 
often characterized as “restructuring without privatization”, has been a matter of 
debate in the literature. And one focus of the debate is on the assessment of the actual 
performance of large enterprises in the first phase of the implementation of the policy, 
i.e., in 1994-97. This is because the actual performance of large enterprises did not 
clearly appear to give confidence to the long-term prospects of the policy.  Yet, it 
turned out that, since late 1997, the state leadership has re-affirmed the policy and 
decided to make it a long-term pursuit. 
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This paper seeks to provide some useful input into the debate.  With a view of 
investigating into the potential of long-term development of large enterprises, we 
estimate the “sequential production technology” in computing the Malmquist 
productivity index for various size-groups of enterprises in Chinese industry. Our 
findings indicate that large enterprises did register the fastest productivity growth and 
improvement in technical efficiency in the 1994-97 period, although it is also true that 
these enterprises started with the lowest level of technical efficiency in 1994.  The 
implication, therefore, is that large-scale, mainly state-owned, enterprises have 
exhibited the potential of making noticeable improvements and the relevant state 
policy does have its justification.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 In the latter half of 1993, China’s state leadership adopted a tightening policy which 
was aimed at curbing the runaway inflation that arose from the economic overheating 
of 1992-93.  The policy lasted until 1997.  In the wake of the East Asian financial 
crisis, China turned to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy of unprecedented scales.  
See Cheng (1999) for an analysis of the drastic policy reversal, and the corresponding 
changes in the macroeconomic conditions, in 1997-98.  
2 Lin and Zhu (2001) provide a detailed documentation of the series of measures, 
pertaining to the policy of “restructuring without privatization”, that have been 
rigorously applied to large SOEs from late 1997. 
3 China’s large, medium and small-scale industrial enterprises are defined according 
to either some technical criteria or the value of their fixed assets.  For instance, iron 
and steel integrated manufacturers with annual output of 600,000 toms or more are 
classified as large scale, those with output of 100,000-600,000 tons are classified as 
medium scale, and those with output below 100,000 tons are classified as small scale. 
See the explanations in Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (1994, pp.463-79).  Also see the 
discussions in Lo (1999).   
4 These figures are obtained in the following way.  For SOEs alone, official statistics 
show that, in 1997, large SOEs accounted for 70% of the value-added of all industrial 
SOEs.  Assuming that this ratio remained the same in 2002 – which is likely an 
under-estimation of the share of large SOEs given the policy of “grasping the large, 
letting go the small” – we can estimate the value-added of large SOEs from that of all 
SOEs.  The estimate turns out to be equivalent to 67% of the value-added of all large 
enterprises in 2002.  For state-controlled large shareholding firms, again given the 
state measures pertaining to the policy of “grasping the large”, it is most likely that 
the value-added share of these enterprises in all large enterprises in 2002 exceeded the 
1997 level of 6%.  Hence the (conservative) estimate that SOEs plus state-controlled 
shareholding firms accounted for around 75% of the value-added of all large 
industrial enterprises in 2002. All the value-added data cited in this footnote are from 
Zhongguo Gongye Jingji Tongji Nianjian (China Industrial Economics Statistical 
Yearbook), various issues. 
5 Data are from Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), various issues. 
The Chinese government has ceased to publish data of the number of industrial 
production establishments (i.e., industrial enterprises) of the national total for the year 
2000 and after. The data used here are estimates on the assumption that, between 1999 
and 2002, this number grew at the same rate as that of the number of industrial 
enterprises of the formal sector. 
6 The simple example used here is for illustration of the problem.  More generally, 
even when there is an upward shift of the production frontier, it is still possible to 
have a negative technical progress.  The situation in the case of multiple inputs is 
more complicated.  One can imagine that the output hyper-planes of different periods 
may intercept with each other, resulting in technical progress in some units and 
technical regress in others. 
7 Coelli, Rao and Battesse (1998) explain clearly how the estimation can be done.  
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 Table 1 Descriptive statistics of variables   
 Industrial value added Net value of fixed assets Number of employees 
 in 1990 constant prices in 1990 constant prices  
 (Rmb 100 million) (Rmb 100 million) (10,000) 
1994    
Mean 131.926  130.676  97.810  
Maximum 776.736  526.091  495.580  
Minimum 3.353  4.907  2.120  
Stand. Dev 137.234  124.468  94.843  
    
1997    
Mean 185.201  219.406  90.467  
Maximum 939.568  906.465  405.090  
Minimum 2.811  8.540  2.640  
Stand. Dev 197.538  205.035  81.354  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Decomposition of Malmquist Index based on contemporaneous production 
technology 
(Geometric means of provincial indices) 
  Efficiency change Technical change TFP growth 
Whole industrial sector  
(i.e. all the 3 size-groups of enterprises) 0.992  0.934  0.927  
Large enterprises 1.120  1.024  1.146  
Medium enterprises 0.893  0.894  0.799  
Small enterprises 0.976  0.890  0.869  
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 Table 3 Decomposition of Malmquist Index based on sequential production technology 
(Geometric means of provincial indices) 
  Efficiency change Technical change TFP growth 
Whole industrial sector  
(All the 3 size-groups of enterprises) 0.895  1.045  0.935  
Large enterprises 1.061  1.119  1.187  
Medium enterprises 0.784  1.014  0.796  
Small enterprises 0.862  1.004  0.866  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Technical efficiency index based on the sequential production frontier approach 
(Geometric means of provincial indices) 
  Constant returns to scale (CRS) Variable returns to scale (VRS) 
  1994 1997 1994 1997 
Whole industrial sector  
(All the 3 size-groups of enterprises) 0.446 0.399 0.511 0.463 
Large enterprises 0.392 0.416 0.488 0.520 
Medium enterprises 0.412 0.323 0.469 0.357 
Small enterprises 0.548 0.472 0.584 0.535 
      
Production units on the Frontier   Yunnan-L*   Guangdong-L   Guangdong-L     Guangdong-L   
   Beijing-S*   Yunnan-L  Shanghai-L      Shanghai-L     
   Liaoning-S*      Hainan-L*        Hainan-L       
    Yunnan-L* Yunnan-L 
    Qinghai-M*       Guangdong-S   
    Beijing-S*      Jiangsu-S      
    Liaoning-S*      Hubei-S        
      Jiangsu – S*        
Note: (1) The capital letters suffixing the province names indicate the enterprise size-groups, i.e., L for large, M for medium 
and S for small enterprises.  (2) Observations of 1994 that are marked with * also appeared on the frontier of sequential 
production technology of 1997. 
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 Table 5 The technical efficiency index across regions 
(Geometric means of provincial indices) 
  Region TE94-CRS TE97-CRS TE94-VRS TE97-VRS 
Large enterprises Coastal 0.512 0.539 0.684 0.691 
 Central 0.317 0.331 0.403 0.436 
 Western 0.334 0.365 0.364 0.413 
      
Medium enterprises Coastal 0.483 0.433 0.526 0.488 
 Central 0.353 0.278 0.378 0.296 
 Western 0.390 0.266 0.503 0.296 
      
Small enterprises Coastal 0.654 0.566 0.705 0.699 
 Central 0.546 0.503 0.554 0.538 
  Western 0.421 0.334 0.467 0.358 
Note: The coastal region is composed of Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan. The central region is composed of Shanxi, Inner 
Mongolia Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan.  The western region is 
composed of Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.  
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 Table 6 Determinants of efficiency change, technical change and TFP growth 
Dependant variable   Efficiency change  
Technical  
change  
TFP  
growth   
        
Constant  0.8424 *** 1.0056 *** 0.8458 *** 
  (0.0545)  (0.0193)  (0.0605)  
        
Dummy for coastal provinces  0.0302  0.0501 ** 0.0732  
  (0.0654)  (0.0231)  (0.0726)  
        
Dummy for central provinces  0.0290  -0.0215  0.0031  
  (0.0593)  (0.0210)  (0.0658)  
        
Dummy for medium enterprises  -0.0792  0.0108  -0.0688  
  (0.0544)  (0.0193)  (0.0605)  
        
Dummy for large enterprises  0.1887 *** 0.1201 *** 0.3206 *** 
  (0.0544)  (0.0193)  (0.0605)  
        
Size of the industrial sector   6.4E-05  -3.8E-05  3.7E-05  
(value-added in 1994)  (8.2E-05)  (2.9E-05)  (9.1E-05)  
                
Adjusted R2  0.2061  0.3898  0.3452  
No. of observations   87   87   87   
Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. 
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 Table 7 Tobit analysis of technical efficiency 
Dependant variable  TE94 (CRS) TE97 (CRS) TE94 (VRS)  TE97 (VRS)
          
Constant  0.4791 *** 0.3841 *** 0.5136 *** 0.3964 *** 
  (0.0434)  (0.0397)  (0.0515)  (0.0428)  
          
Dummy for coastal provinces  0.0859 * 0.0886 * 0.0862  0.1128 ** 
  (0.0520)  (0.0476)  (0.0619)  (0.0514)  
          
Dummy for central provinces  -0.0174  0.0015  -0.0678  -0.0017  
  (0.0471)  (0.0432)  (0.0560)  (0.0466)  
          
Dummy for medium-sized   -0.1561 *** -0.1652 *** -0.1248 ** -0.2165 *** 
Enterprises  (0.0433)  (0.0396)  (0.0516)  (0.0430)  
          
Dummy for large enterprises  -0.1626 *** -0.0503  -0.0888 * -0.0271  
  (0.0433)  (0.0397)  (0.0518)  (0.0432)  
          
Size of the industrial sector   0.0002 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0004 *** 
(value-added in the year  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
                
Adjusted R2  0.3411  0.3787  0.3095  0.5737  
Number of observations  87  87  87    87  
Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1 The percentage shares of value-added, labour employment and net value of fixed 
assets of large enterprises in Chinese industry 
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Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) and Zhongguo Gongye Jingji 
Tongji Nianjian (China Industrial Economics Statistical Yearbook), various years. 
Notes: V= industrial value-added; L = year-average labour employment; K = net value of 
fixed assets. 
The total of Chinese industry refers to all industrial establishments in the country, 
including very small-scale rural industrial establishments.  Its value-added figures 
are from data of the industry component of GDP.  Its labour employment figures 
are from data of the industry component of total employment in the society.  And 
its fixed assets figures are estimated on the basis of the capital-output ratio of the 
formal sector of Chinese industry – i.e., township-and-above independently 
accounting industrial enterprises for 1997 and before, and all state-owned industrial 
enterprises plus above-scale (of five million yuan in sales revenue) non-state-owned 
industrial enterprises for 1998 and after.  Because informal industrial 
establishments are conceivably with a lower capital-output ratio than formal 
industrial enterprises, the K-curve in the graph is likely to over-state the total capital 
stock of Chinese industry and therefore under-state the capital share of large 
industrial enterprises. 
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Figure 2 Decomposition of Malmquist index 
 
F .
yt+1 
y 
yt 
E 
D 
0 
yb 
yc 
xt+1 x xt 
Frontier in 
period t 
Frontier in 
period t+1
ya 
F’ .
F”. Frontier in period t+1 
with negative 
productivity growth 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Production frontiersof Chinese industry (1994 and 1997, constant returns to scale) 
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